

**CHALMERS**  
UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

# INTRUSION DETECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

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DAT 300 – 2019/2020



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# Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

*Functionality, whereabouts, and current state*

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# Industrial Control Systems

Monitor and control industrial processes and often  
operate on critical infrastructure

# Nuclear plants



# Electricity grids



*[www.kiplinger.com](http://www.kiplinger.com)*



# Transportation



# Water systems



[www.kiplinger.com](http://www.kiplinger.com)

# Gas pipelines




# Communication



*[www.kiplinger.com](http://www.kiplinger.com)*

## Map of Industrial Control Systems on the Internet



[www.shodan.io](http://www.shodan.io)

## The Internet's most dangerous sites

Some things just shouldn't be connected to the Internet. With Shodan, a search engine that finds connected devices, it's easy to locate dangerous things that anyone can access without so much as a username or password.

### Traffic light controls

When something that literally anyone in the world can access says "DEATH MAY OCCUR !!!" it's generally a good idea to build some kind of security around it.

Oops - no. For some reason, someone thought it would be a good idea to put traffic light controls on the Internet. Making matters way, way worse is that these controls require no login credentials whatsoever. Just type in the address, and you've got access.



PHOTO: DAN TETLER; THINKSTOCK

This is why Caps Lock was invented.

## The Internet's most dangerous sites

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### A swimming pool acid pump

Swimming pools have acid pumps to adjust the pH balance of the water. They're usually not connected to the Internet.

At least one of them is, though. So, exactly how powerful and toxic is this acid pump?

"Can we turn people into soup?" wondered Tentler.

Tentler said there was no distinguishing text in this app to tip him off to where the pool was located or whom it is owned by, so the owners haven't been contacted. Enter at your own risk!





## The Internet's most dangerous sites


Some things just shouldn't be connected to the Internet. With Shodan, a search engine that finds connected devices, it's easy to locate dangerous things that anyone can access without so much as a username or password.

### A hydroelectric plant

French electric companies apparently like to put their hydroelectric plants online. Tentler found three of them using Shodan.


This one has a big fat button that lets you shut off a turbine. But what's 58,700 Watts between friends, right?

It's not just France that has a problem. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security commissioned researchers last year to see if they could find **industrial control systems for nuclear power plants** using Shodan. They found several.



Wait, does that say kilowatts?

## Connectivity of ICS: A Curse or a Blessing?



- + Improved operational efficiency
- + Efficient use of resources
- + Customized services
- + Enhanced interfacing
- + Better diagnostics
- Exposing critical systems to cyberattacks

[www.aspistrategist.org.au](http://www.aspistrategist.org.au)



## Attacks on ICS



## Attacks on ICS



## Attacks on ICS





## Cyber Warfare in the Horizon

**MilitaryTimes**

### **Military plans to counter Iran include possible 120,000 troop deployment, cyber attack ‘Nitro Zeus’**

The updated military plans do not call for an Iraq War-style land invasion but instead focus on air strikes and a potential cyber-attack, which in previous plans had been called “Nitro Zeus” and would have attempted to disable major Iranian cities, military facilities and the power grid. That plan dates to at least 2010 or earlier, experts have said.

The Pentagon recently presented a [military plan](#) to the president’s top national security aides that calls for up to 120,000 troops deploying to the Middle East and a potential crippling cyber-attack on Iran’s infrastructure should Iran speed up its nuclear program or attack U.S. forces.

[www.militarytimes.com](http://www.militarytimes.com)


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# Securing Industrial Control Systems

*Challenges and opportunities*

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## Abstract representation of ICS



## Challenges

- ▶ Closed-source, legacy, proprietary, and widely different
- ▶ Real-time requirements
- ▶ Data is sensitive and hard to access


## Importance of securing ICS

- ▶ ICS interact with the physical world
- ▶ Far-reaching attack consequences
- ▶ Too much at stake

## Opportunities




- ▶ Process behavior is deterministic
- ▶ Static topologies
- ▶ Machine-to-machine traffic is highly regular
- ▶ Normal system behavior can be learned or modeled

# State-of-the-Art Methodology









# Visualization



# Visualization






# Visualization




**PASAD learns from historical data**

# Visualization




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


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


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





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


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




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
**Departure score consistently below threshold**

# Visualization




**Departure score consistently below threshold**

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




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





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
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


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




# Visualization



**Vectors depart from cluster during attack**




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




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


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# Visualization






**Vectors depart from cluster during attack**

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


**Vectors depart from cluster during attack**

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
**Vectors depart from cluster during attack**

# Visualization




**Vectors depart from cluster during attack**

# Experimental Results






# Experimental Results





$x_1 \ x_2 \ \cdots \ x_{N-1} \ x_N \ x_{N+1} \ \cdots \ x_{\delta-L} \ x_{\delta-L+1} \ x_{\delta-L+2} \ \cdots \ x_{\delta} \ \cdots$

### Training series


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




















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